In the philosophy of language, the distinction between concept and object is attributable to the German philosopher Gottlob Frege. Overview. According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists Frege, G. ” On Concept and Object”, originally published as “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand” in. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. Original: “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand”, in Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie XVI (): –;; In English: “Concept. Download Citation on ResearchGate | Kerry und frege über begriff und gegenstand 1 | After describing the philosophical background of Kerry’s work, an account.
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Reprinted in KStr. In addition, the two corresponded rather extensively from to ; it is clear from this correspondence that Frege and Wittgenstein thought highly of each other the end of the correspondence is marked by an exchange of rather critical remarks by Frege on the Tractatus and by Wittgenstein on “Der Beriff.
Feigl as “On Sense and Nominatum,” in H. Kluge in McGuinness  pp. In the last year of his life, at the age of 76, his diary contains extreme right-wing political opinions, opposing the parliamentary system, democrats, liberals, Catholics, the French and Jews, who he thought ought to be deprived of political rights and, preferably, expelled from Germany.
In this article, Frege criticizes Hilbert’s understanding and use of the axiomatic method. This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published or registered with the U.
Frege, Gottlob (–) |
In the monograph Begriffsschrift Frege introduces his most powerful technical invention, nowadays known as predicate logic. Frge was more than a teacher to Frege: The first of these frsge an admonition to separate the logical from the psychological a motif that runs through all of Frege’s works ; the third demands observance of the concept-object distinction.
Hintikka, Synthese Library, D. His book the Foundations of Arithmetic is the seminal text of the logicist project, and is cited by Michael Dummett as where to pinpoint the linguistic turn. The logical connectives, as well as the quantifiers, are taken to be denoting expressions, having as references the requisite truth functions and higher-order functions, respectively. The system of the Grundgesetze entails that the set thus characterised both is and is not a member of itself, and is thus inconsistent.
The case is special because what is here being called the extension of crege predicate, or a set, is only one type of “value-range” of a function. Putnam CUP, pp.
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Vortrag, gehalten in der Sitzung vom 9. Verlag Hermann Pohle online version. While he followed Immanuel Kant in taking the truths of Euclidean geometry to be synthetic and knowable a priori forcefully defending this fregf against Hilbert’s axiomatic method in geometryhe vigorously argued, against Kant, for the logicist thesis, that is, the claim that the arithmetic truths, presumably including real and complex analysis, are analytic.
Frege’s distinction leads to the famous difficulty or “awkwardness of language” that some expressions which purport to signify a concept — Frege’s example is “the concept horse ” — are trege expressions that by his criterion signify an Object. For this special type of identity statement, the truth conditions can readily be formulated in dyadic second-order logical terms, namely, the number belonging to F is the same as the number belonging to G if and only if there exists a knd relation R that correlates the objects that are F one-one and onto with the objects ffege are G.
Koebner, ; reprinted Breslau: History and Interpretation” Oxford University Press.
Concept and object
Mahoney, in Philosophy of Mathematics: Thomae, Sammlung von Formeln welche bei Anwendung der elliptischen und Rosenhain’schen Funktionen gebraucht werden. From Wikipedia, gsgenstand free encyclopedia.
Clarendon CopiI. Frege’s work in logic had little international attention until when Russell wrote an appendix to The Principles of Mathematics stating his differences with Frege. Basil Blackwell NagelE. Bauer-Mengelberg Harvard University Press,pp.
This image may not be in the public domain in these countries, which moreover do not implement the rule of the shorter term. The footnotes containing Frege’s remarks are collated and reprinted in Angelelli  pp. A Logical Inquiry,” in Mind 65 The Ontology of Reference. In determining the ontological status of certain entities Frege often behriff by analyzing the expressions used to refer to them and takes the saturated or unsaturated nature of the expressions free a reliable guide to their ontological saturation status.
This page was last edited on 1 Novemberat Frege immediately realized that the antinomy threatened to undermine his life’s work.
I’m indebted to Wolfgang Kienzler for suggesting several important improvements to this catalog. Olms AngelelliI. The distinction was of fundamental importance to the development of logic and mathematics. Olms, ; reprinted in Thiel . He thereby devised a formal logical language adequate for the formalization of mathematical propositions, especially through the possibility of expressing multiply general statements such as ” for every prime numberthere is a greater one.
Blackwell, third edition GeachP. Essays towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics.
Frege wrote a hasty, last-minute Appendix to Vol. In the United States, besides those mentioned earlier, Donald Davidson’s work also revived discussion of Fregean themes.
Frege carefully distinguishes between basic laws axioms on the one hand, and inference rules on the other hand.
This was the position I was placed in by a letter of Mr. Stoothoff Blackwell,included in CPpp.